Rational capacity as a condition on blame

Philosophical Books 48 (2):109–123 (2007)
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Abstract

In "Rational Capacities" Michael Smith outlines the sense of capacity he believes to be required before blame is appropriate. I question whether this sense of capacity is required. In so doing, I consider different ways in which blame might be conditioned.

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10.1111/j.1468-0149.2007.00435.x

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Pamela Hieronymi
University of California, Los Angeles

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References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Two Faces of Responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227-248.
Skepticism about weakness of will.Gary Watson - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.

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