Carnap’s Theory of Descriptions and its Problems

Studia Logica 94 (3):355-380 (2010)
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Abstract

Carnap's theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum . The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap's theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.

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Jan Heylen
KU Leuven

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The epistemic significance of numerals.Jan Heylen - 2014 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 5):1019-1045.
Russell's Revenge: A Problem for Bivalent Fregean Theories of Descriptions.Jan Heylen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):636-652.

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References found in this work

Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.
A New Introduction to Modal Logic.M. J. Cresswell & G. E. Hughes - 1996 - New York: Routledge. Edited by M. J. Cresswell.
Computability and Logic.George Boolos, John Burgess, Richard P. & C. Jeffrey - 1980 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by John P. Burgess & Richard C. Jeffrey.
Modalities and quantification.Rudolf Carnap - 1946 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (2):33-64.

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