Disputatio 8 (9):521-539 (2019)

Sybren Heyndels
University College Dublin
In order to ward off the global threat of a regress of justification, Brandom argues that some claims in our linguistic practices must be treated as “innocent until proven guilty’, i.e. participants must be treated as prima facie entitled when making them. Examples he gives include claims such as “There have been black dogs” and “I have ten fingers”. Brandom calls this idea “the default and challenge structure of entitlement”. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argues that there are basic certainties (“hinge propositions” or “hinges”) such as “The world existed long before I was born” or “This is a tree” that cannot be meaningfully doubted because they provide the basic frameworks for our language–games in the first place. The aim of this article is threefold. First, it offers an understanding of Brandom’s philosophical project in the light of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Secondly, it shows how Brandom may help to elucidate some of the more mysterious passages in Wittgenstein’s “third masterpiece”. Thirdly, it outlines a sketch of a promising solution to an old philosophical riddle.
Keywords Wittgenstein  Brandom  Scepticism  Regress of Justification  Epistemology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2019
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,944
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Later Wittgenstein on Doubt and Certainty.Mohammadsadegh Zahedi & Khadijeh Asli Bage - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 8 (14):93-112.
The Animal in Epistemology.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):97-119.
Wittgenstein on Rules and Practices.Mark Mccullagh - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:83-100.
Making It Implicit: Brandom on Rule Following.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):419-431.
A visita de Wittgenstein à epistemologia.Maíra de Cinque Pereira da Costa - 2015 - In Arley Moreno (ed.), Coleção CLE. Campinas, SP: Coleção CLE.
Rationality and the Variety of Language Games.Giacomo Turbanti - 2019 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 8 (9).
Introduction: Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):73-78.
Wittgenstein's Scepticism' in on Certainty.Norman Malcolm - 1988 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):277 – 293.


Added to PP index

Total views
13 ( #765,504 of 2,498,140 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #427,476 of 2,498,140 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes