Artificial moral agents are infeasible with foreseeable technologies

Ethics and Information Technology 16 (3):197-206 (2014)
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Abstract

For an artificial agent to be morally praiseworthy, its rules for behaviour and the mechanisms for supplying those rules must not be supplied entirely by external humans. Such systems are a substantial departure from current technologies and theory, and are a low prospect. With foreseeable technologies, an artificial agent will carry zero responsibility for its behavior and humans will retain full responsibility.

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10.1007/s10676-014-9345-6

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Citations of this work

Robots, Law and the Retribution Gap.John Danaher - 2016 - Ethics and Information Technology 18 (4):299–309.
Autonomous weapons systems, killer robots and human dignity.Amanda Sharkey - 2019 - Ethics and Information Technology 21 (2):75-87.
Can we program or train robots to be good?Amanda Sharkey - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 22 (4):283-295.

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References found in this work

A computational foundation for the study of cognition.David Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.
On the morality of artificial agents.Luciano Floridi & J. W. Sanders - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):349-379.
Killer robots.Robert Sparrow - 2007 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):62–77.

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