Sceptical possibilities? No worries

Synthese 168 (1):97 - 118 (2009)
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Abstract

This paper undermines a paradigmatic form of sceptical reasoning. It does this by describing, and then dialectically dissolving, the sceptical-independence presumption, upon which that form of sceptical reasoning relies.

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Stephen Hetherington
University of New South Wales

Citations of this work

Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism.Guido Tana - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-30.
Skeptical challenges and knowing actions.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):18-39.

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References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
The significance of philosophical scepticism.Barry Stroud - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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