Authors
Stephen Hetherington
University of New South Wales
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories No categories specified
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI ppr199151495
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The Extended Knower.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):207 - 218.

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