Abstract

A philosophical conception of norms is developed and defended. Chapter I first examines the received view of norms in the social scientific and philosophical literature. On this view, norms are rule-like, an essentially subjective or internal conception. It will be argued, however, that norms are better described as patterns of behavior, an objective or external conception. The pattern view achieves a better fit with our intuitive understanding of norms, and is better suited to the role norms are to play in social theory. The second chapter continues the appraisal of the pattern conception by looking at how norms perform in an applied theoretical context, namely, utilitarian moral theory. The third and fourth chapters attempt to reconcile the notion of conformity necessary to the pattern conception with the dictates of methodological individualism. The possibility of an individualistic grounding will be seen to depend on the types of individuals that are assumed to exist. As this study assumes the existence of moral motivation, as well as narrowly self-interested, rational motivation, an individualistic grounding will require a moral and a rational grounding for norms. Chapter III discusses the rational grounding and Chapter IV the moral. In addition, the analysis of the types of situations in which conformity is rational and moral will provide a superior typology of norms