Conceivability and modal knowledge

In Tamara Horowitz & Gerald J. Massey (eds.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (1991)
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Abstract

I argue for an analysis of conceivability as a form of modal knowledge: to conceive of p's being true is to know that "Possibly, p" is true.

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Stephen Hetherington
University of New South Wales

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Of zombies, color scientists, and floating iron bars.Tamler Sommers - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.

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