Recently, a number of experimental philosophers have converged on the position that the ordinary concept of weakness of will does not solely consist in “judgment” or “intention” violation but is more like a cluster concept in which each factor plays contributory roles in the application of the concept. This, however, raises the question as to which factor is more central or plays a more significant role in folk’s understanding of the concept. I contend that the ordinary concept of weakness of will is primarily constituted by the “executive commitment” rather than the “evaluative commitment” practices. Drawing on extensive evidence from developmental psychology, I will argue that the executive commitment, which, as I will show, involve intention recognition and metarepresentation, is developmentally prior and more fundamental in our exercise and intuitive understanding of the concept.
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-019-09617-6
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Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Richard E. Aquila - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1):159-170.

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