Law and Philosophy 31 (3):343-365 (2012)

Authors
Ori Herstein
King's College London
Abstract
Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition for an autonomous life and for autonomous moral self-constitution. This view has its critics. Responding to these objections reveals that none refute the coherence of the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral wrong’. At most, some objections successfully challenge the weight and frequency of the personal autonomy reasons for such rights. Autonomy-based moral rights to do moral wrong are therefore conceptually possible as well as, at least on occasion, actual
Keywords rights  rights theory  right to do wrong  moral rights  ethics  autonomy  moral philosophy  normative ethics
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DOI 10.1007/s10982-011-9126-x
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References found in this work BETA

A Right to Do Wrong.Jeremy Waldron - 1981 - Ethics 92 (1):21-39.
Theories of Rights.Alon Harel - 2005 - In Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell.
The Right to Do Wrong.Gerhard Øverland - 2007 - Law and Philosophy 26 (4):377-404.

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Citations of this work BETA

From Rights to Prerogatives.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):608-623.
Rights.Leif Wenar - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Transcending the Means Principle.Alec Walen - 2014 - Law and Philosophy 33 (4):427-464.
Privacy and the Importance of ‘Getting Away With It’.Cressida Gaukroger - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (4):416-439.

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