Abstract

Philosophers have long debated whether or not a determined action can be free. Central to much of this discussion is what I term 'free will satisfactionism'---the thesis that the most plausible account of free action must satisfy our intuitive concepts of moral responsibility and agent-control, and so these notions constitute evidence for, or against, theories of free action. I contend that this satisfactionist strategy is fundamentally inadequate because our intuitive concepts of responsibility and control simply cannot be satisfied by any account of free action. I contend that free will satisfactionism ultimately leads to free will nihilism. In response, I formulate an alternative method that I dub 'free will clarificationism'---the thesis that the most plausible account of free action can clarify our intuitive concepts of moral responsibility and agent-control, and so these notions do not constitute evidence for, or against, theories of free action. The relation between a person and his free action is a metaphysical relation that, I urge, is not discovered by using moral notions, but only those that are purely metaphysical. Thus, any account of free action that takes those acts to be, necessarily undetermined or possibly determined must be justified by foundational notions in action theory alone. ;I pursue my clarificationist approach to free action with a detailed investigation of foundational notions in action theory such as events, actions, and intentional actions. I then construct a defense of incompatibilism. First, using this purely metaphysical method, I diffuse two popular objections to incompatibilist theories of free action: the objection from an alleged explanatory superiority of determinism and Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities. Second, I develop an original---and purely metaphysical---argument that free actions must be undetermined. Therefore, our free choices are "contingent," but for metaphysical, rather than moral, reasons