Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):755-779 (2021)

Authors
Jared Henderson
University of Connecticut
Abstract
I argue for two claims: that the ordinary English truth predicate is a gradable adjective and that truth is a property that comes in degrees. The first is a semantic claim, motivated by the linguistic evidence and the similarity of the truth predicate’s behavior to other gradable terms. The second is a claim in natural language metaphysics, motivated by interpreting the best semantic analysis of gradable terms as applied to the truth predicate. In addition to providing arguments for these two claims, I draw out consequences for debates about deflationism and truth-based analyses of notions such as assertion and logical consequence.
Keywords truth  gradable adjectives  deflationism  semantics
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10992-020-09584-3
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Language, Truth and Logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Princeton University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.

View all 45 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Contextualism and Gradability.Romy Jaster - 2013 - GAP.8 Proceedings.
Truth: The Deflationary Theory Vs. The Semantic Theory.Glen Adam Hoffmann - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
Relativism, Vagueness and What is Said.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2008 - In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 129.
Deflationism and the Function of Truth.Lavinia Picollo & Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):326-351.
Radical Anti-Deflationism.Peter S. Dillard - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):173 - 181.
Deflationism and the Value of Truth.James R. Beebe - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:391-402.
Deflating Deflationism.Bradley Philip Armour-Garb - 1999 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Context, Content, and Relativism.Michael Glanzberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.
New Wave Deflationism.Nic Damnjanovic - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 45--58.
Tasting and testing.Inés Crespo & Frank Veltman - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (6):617-653.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-10-29

Total views
230 ( #47,743 of 2,497,977 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
42 ( #20,347 of 2,497,977 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes