On the testability of psychological generalizations (psychological testability)

Philosophy of Science (December) 586 (December):586-606 (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Rosenberg argues that intentional generalizations in the human sciences cannot be law-like because they are not amenable to significant empirical refinement. This irrefinability is said to result from the principle that supposedly controls in intentional explanation also serving as the standard for successful interpretation. The only credible evidence bearing on such a principle would then need conform to it. I argue that psychological generalizations are refinable and can be nomic. I show how empirical refinement of psychological generalizations is possible by considering concrete cases. A sufficiently detailed view of the role of psychological generalizations in interpretation allows us to find in psychological investigations instances of bootstrap testing

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,479

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

What's wrong with the syntactic theory of mind.M. Frances Egan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (December):664-74.
In defense of psychological laws.Martin Carrier - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):217 – 232.
Reflections on Peirce's Concepts of Testability and the Economy of Research.Jeff Foss - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:28 - 39.
Meaning holism and intentional psychology.Andr Kukla - 1989 - Analysis 49 (October):173-175.
The testability of the identity theory.Kenneth G. Lucey - 1975 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):142-147.
Chisholm on Brentano's thesis.David H. Sanford - 1997 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court. pp. 25--201.
Paranoia and reinforced dogmatism: Beyond critical rationality.Abraham Rudnick - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):339-350.
Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations?Murat Aydede & Philip Robbins - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
44 (#268,081)

6 months
2 (#302,213)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Henderson
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references