Morality and Luck

Philosophy 59 (229):323 - 330 (1984)
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Abstract

Thomas Nagel recognizes that it is commonly believed that people can neither be held morally responsible nor morally assessed for what is beyond their control. Yet he is convinced that although such a belief may be intuitively plausible, upon reflection we find that we do make moral assessments of persons in a large number of cases in which such assessments depend on factors not under their control. Of such factors he says: (p. 26)

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Citations of this work

Moral Luck.Dana K. Nelkin - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral Luck as Moral Lack of Control.Mark B. Anderson - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):5-29.
Accepting Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge.
Moral luck and the law.David Enoch - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):42-54.
A Defence of the Control Principle.Martin Sand - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):765-775.

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