Abstract

What I intend to show is that neither substance metaphysics nor process metaphysics can adequately account for the persistence of the moral agent in the context of promising. First I show that certain "necessary" characteristics of agency imply that any agent must persist. I also offer an account of various theories of action and agency which I feel are representative of these theories as a whole, and claim that each of these theories is committed to a presupposition of persistence concerning the nature of the agent. ;I then deal with exposition and criticism of both the substance and process views concerning persistence and moral agency. I begin with an account of substance from within the Aristotelian tradition which leads me to define substance as both locus of change and substratum. Next I relate an argument made by Johanna Seibt which shows, I believe, that the presuppositions of substance ontology make the problem of persistence inevitable given a substance-metaphysical view. ;My discussion of process metaphysics is mostly an account of persistent agency from within the metaphysical system of A.N. Whitehead, which is a paradigmatic example of a systematic process-metaphysical view. I then consider two other process views, those of James and Bergson. I end my discussion of process metaphysics by offering 5 presuppositions which I believe process metaphysics must accept. ;Next I turn to a discussion of the relationships between, on the one hand, substance, process, and persistence, and on the other hand, substance, process, and agency. I return to the ontological criteria delineated earlier in order to show that, in these respects at least, substance and process metaphysics are inadequate to the concept of the persistence of the moral agent. Lastly, I offer more detailed criticisms of the concept of persistence from within process-metaphysical views