Realism and antirealism in artificial intelligence

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1):19-26 (1987)
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Abstract

In the philosophy of mind, the controversy between realists and antirealists often concerns the logical form of sentences embedded in attitude reports. Antirealists believe that such sentences refer to psychological states; realists believe that they refer to situations or states of the world. In this essay, it is shown how these two modes of semantic representation are associated with different approaches to the computational modeling of cognitive processes. I put forward a normative account of methodology in artificial intelligence that reconciles realism and antirealism, and suggest that my account sheds light on the problem of representing the logical form of attitude reports

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References found in this work

A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1969 - Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner.
Situations and attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1983 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Edited by John Perry.

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