Theory and Decision 66 (4):301-315 (2009)
AbstractEllsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75, 643–669 (1961); Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, Garland Publishing (2001)) argued that uncertainty is not reducible to risk. At the center of Ellsberg’s argument lies a thought experiment that has come to be known as the three-color example. It has been observed that a significant number of sophisticated decision makers violate the requirements of subjective expected utility theory when they are confronted with Ellsberg’s three-color example. More generally, such decision makers are in conflict with either the ordering assumption or the independence assumption of subjective expected utility theory. While a clear majority of the theoretical responses to these violations have advocated maintaining ordering while relaxing independence, a persistent minority has advocated abandoning the ordering assumption. The purpose of this paper is to consider a similar dilemma that exists within the context of multiattribute models, where it arises by considering indeterminacy in the weighting of attributes rather than indeterminacy in the determination of probabilities as in Ellsberg’s example.
Similar books and articles
Empirical Rules of Thumb for Choice Under Uncertainty.Rolf Aaberge - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (3):431-438.
Distinguishing Indeterminate Belief From “Risk-Averse” Preferences.Katie Steele - 2007 - Synthese 158 (2):189-205.
Production Under Uncertainty and Choice Under Uncertainty in the Emergence of Generalized Expected Utility Theory.John Quiggin - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):125-144.
E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox.Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (2):107-138.
Revealed Preference and Expected Utility.Stephen A. Clark - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (2):159-174.
Lottery Dependent Utility: A Reexamination.Ulrich Schmidt - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (1):35-58.
Testing the Effects of Similarity on Risky Choice: Implications for Violations of Expected Utility.David E. Buschena & David Zilberman - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (3):253-280.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Rationalizing Two-Tiered Choice Functions Through Conditional Choice.Jeffrey Helzner - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):929-951.
References found in this work
The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.
Unreliable Probabilities, Risk Taking, and Decision Making.Peter Gärdenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin - 1982 - Synthese 53 (3):361-386.