Indicative conditionals and logical consequence


For an indicative conditional to be true it is not generally sufficient that its antecedent be false or its consequent true. I propose to analyse such a conditional as strong, i.e. as containing a tacit quantification over a domain of possible situations, with the if-clause specifying that domain such that the conditional gets assigned the appropriate truth conditions. Now, one definition of logical consequence proceeds in terms of a natural-language conditional. Interpreting it as strong leads to a paraconsistent consequence relation, though the motivation behind it is not to reason coherently about contradictions but to reason entirely without them.



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