Expected content

Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):424-432 (2008)
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We propose an approach to assigning propositional content to deliberate acts of arbitrary type, as opposed to just speech acts. This approach, which is based on the idea that the content of an act is the decision maker's expectation concerning the change that would take place if the act were to be performed, is shown to be related to the concept of expected utility that has played a central role in various accounts of rationality.



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