Conditions

Abstract

Any theory of conditions must solve the symmetry problem, i.e. must explain why being a necessary condition and being sufficient condition in many cases are not mutual converses, yet in some cases having to do with the notion of truth they are; and must explain why being a necessary and sufficient condition is generally non-symmetric, yet in some cases having to do with the notion of truth is symmetric. I explain the problem and propose a solution.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,102

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Conditions.Roger Wertheimer - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (12):355-364.
Truth Without Objectivity.Max Kölbel - 2002 - London and New York: Routledge.
Are necessary and sufficient conditions converse relations?Gilberto Gomes - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):375 – 387.
What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
Meaning and truth-conditions: A reply to Kemp.Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.
Causes, conditions and counterfactuals.Tomasz Bigaj - 2005 - Axiomathes 15 (4):599-619.
The Logical Paradox of Causation.Yuval Steinitz - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26:223-227.
Fumerton's Puzzle for Theories of Rationality.Ru Ye - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):93-108.
Revízia definícií pojmov dostatočná a nutná podmienka1.František Gahér - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):16-37.
The Indispensibility of Internalism in Epistemology.Fatih S. M. Ozturk - 2004 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
Punishment and Therapy: A Progressive Synthesis.Markus Johann Wolf - 2003 - Dissertation, University of South Africa (South Africa)

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-06-16

Downloads
11 (#1,022,695)

6 months
1 (#1,241,711)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references