Beyond phenomenal naivete

Philosophers' Imprint 6:1-24 (2006)
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Abstract

The naive realist takes a veridical visual experience to be an immediate relation to external entities. Is this how such an experience is phenomenally, by its phenomenal character? Only if there can be phenomenal error, since a hallucinatory experience phenomenally matching such a veridical experience would then be phenomenally but not in fact such a relation. Fortunately, such phenomenal error can be avoided: the phenomenal character of a visual experience involves immediate awareness of a sort of picture of external entities, as on a representative theory of perception. The attraction of naive realism results from an erroneous projection of the immediacy of the subject's awareness of this picture onto the external entities pictured.

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Benj Hellie
University of Toronto at Scarborough

Citations of this work

Attention and mental paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
Spatial representations in sensory modalities.Tony Cheng - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (3):485-500.
Lessons from beyond vision (sounds and audition).Casey O’Callaghan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):143-160.

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