Bayes and beyond

Philosophy of Science 64 (2):191-221 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Several leading topics outstanding after John Earman's Bayes or Bust? are investigated further, with emphasis on the relevance of Bayesian explication in epistemology of science, despite certain limitations. (1) Dutch Book arguments are reformulated so that their independence from utility and preference in epistemic contexts is evident. (2) The Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem problem is pursued; the phenomenon of a "protective belt" of auxiliary statements around reasonably successful theories is explicated. (3) The Bayesian approach to understanding the superiority of variety of evidence is pursued; a recent challenge (by Wayne) is converted into a positive result on behalf of the Bayesian analysis, potentially with far-reaching consequences. (4) The condition for applying the merger-of-opinion results and the thesis of underdetermination of theories are compared, revealing significant limitations in applicability of the former. (5) Implications concerning "diachronic Dutch Book" arguments and "non-Bayesian shifts" are drawn, highlighting the incompleteness, but not incorrectness, of Bayesian analysis

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
77 (#196,770)

6 months
20 (#102,067)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Geoffrey Hellman
University of Minnesota

Citations of this work

From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability.Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.
Bayes' theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Preference-based arguments for probabilism.David Christensen - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.
Depragmatized dutch book arguments.Patrick Maher - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (2):291-305.
A logic of induction.Colin Howson - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (2):268-290.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Explanation and scientific understanding.Michael Friedman - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):5-19.
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.
Concepts of supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Clever bookies and coherent beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.

View all 14 references / Add more references