The numbers don't fit: a problem for reliabilism

Epistemologia 37 (1):96-105 (2014)
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Abstract

Reliabilism suffers from a problem with long sequences of justifications. The theory of justification provided in process reliabilism allows for an implausibly large extension of ‘justified belief’. According to process reliabilist theory, it is possible that a justifying cognitive process has an arbitrarily low probability of being successful and a justified belief an arbitrarily low probability of being true. This result violates reliabilism’s aims as well as our ordinary standards of justification.

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10.3280/epis2014-001006

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Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs
Forschungszentrum Jülich

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What lottery problem for reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.

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