Deliberation and confidence change

Synthese 200 (1):1-13 (2022)
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We argue that social deliberation may increase an agent’s confidence and credence under certain circumstances. An agent considers a proposition H and assigns a probability to it. However, she is not fully confident that she herself is reliable in this assignment. She then endorses H during deliberation with another person, expecting him to raise serious objections. To her surprise, however, the other person does not raise any objections to H. How should her attitudes toward H change? It seems plausible that she should increase the credence she assigns to H and, at the same time, increase the reliability she assigns to herself concerning H. A Bayesian model helps us to investigate under what conditions, if any, this is rational.

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Author Profiles

Nora Heinzelmann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Stephan Hartmann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

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References found in this work

Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.
A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.

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