The Monist 104 (2):251-264 (2021)

Authors
Nora Heinzelmann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
In some vicarious cases of compensation, an agent seems obligated to compensate for a harm they did not inflict. This raises the problem that obligations for compensation may arise out of circumstantial luck. That is, an agent may owe compensation for a harm that was outside their control. Addressing this issue, I identify five conditions for compensation from the literature: causal engagement, proxy, ill-gotten gains, constitution, and affiliation. I argue that only two of them specify genuine and irreducible grounds for compensation, and that factors determining the agent’s obligations may be beyond their control. However, I suggest that this is unproblematic. There is thus no problem of circumstantial moral luck for compensation.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2021
DOI 10.1093/monist/onaa036
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Difficulty Concerning Compensation.Saul Smilansky - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3):329-337.
Moral Luck and Business Ethics.Christopher Michaelson - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 83 (4):773-787.
The Counterfactual Conception of Compensation.Rodney C. Roberts - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (3-4):414–428.
The Compensation Principle.Simkulet William - 2015 - Filosofiska Notiser 2 (1):47-60.
Non-Compensable Harms.Todd N. Karhu - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):222–230.
Moral Luck and Moral Performance.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):1017-1028.
A Problem for Moral Luck.Steven D. Hales - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2385-2403.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-12-16

Total views
136 ( #81,143 of 2,462,724 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
67 ( #11,798 of 2,462,724 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes