Questionable Research Practices and Credit in Academic Careers

Abstract

This paper investigates how the credit incentive to engage in questionable research practices interacts with cumulative advantage, the process whereby high-status academics more easily increase their status than low-status academics. I use a mathematical model to highlight two dynamics that have not yet received much attention. First, due to cumulative advantage, questionable research practices may pay off over the course of an academic career even if they do not appear attractive at the level of individual publications. Second, because of the role of bottleneck moments in academic careers, questionable research practices may be selected for even if they do not provide a benefit in expectation. I also observe that, within the model, the most successful academics are the most likely to have benefited from fraud. This paper has been published under a different title. See PhilPapers record HEECAA or DOI 10.1086/716235

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Remco Heesen
London School of Economics

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References found in this work

The division of cognitive labor.Philip Kitcher - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-22.
The Role of the Priority Rule in Science.Michael Strevens - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):55-79.
Prestige Bias: An Obstacle to a Just Academic Philosophy.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
On fraud.Liam Kofi Bright - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):291-310.

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