Why Do We Value True Beliefs?

Syndicate Philosophy 1 (2017)
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Abstract

In my contribution to this symposium on Miriam McCormick's Believing Against the Evidence, I challenge her claim that true beliefs are not valuable for their own sake. I argue that positing that true beliefs have at least some non-instrumental value better explains our attitudes toward the pursuit of truth than her alternative view. McCormick offers a response in the next segment of the symposium.

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Trevor Hedberg
University of Arizona

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