Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure

Utilitas 30 (2):219-227 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper responds to a new objection, due to Ben Bramble, against attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and pain: the objection from unconscious pleasures and pains. According to the objection, attitudinal theories are unable to accommodate the fact that sometimes we experience pleasures and pains of which we are, at the time, unaware. In response, I distinguish two kinds of unawareness and argue that the subjects in the examples that support the objection are unaware of their sensations in only a weak sense, and this weak sort of unawareness of a sensation does not preclude its being an object of one’s attitudes.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Pleasure, Desire, and Oppositeness.Justin Klocksiem - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-7.
Polymorphous Pleasures: A Study in Grace.Karmen Mackendrick - 1994 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook
Extrinsic attitudinal pleasure.Thomas A. Blackson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):277-291.
The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire.Chris Heathwood - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44.
Six theses about pleasure.Stuart Rachels - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):247-267.
Impure Intellectual Pleasure and the Phaedrus.Kelly E. Arenson - 2016 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (1):21-45.
On Feldman's theory of happiness.Thomas Blackson - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):393-400.
The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism.Fred Feldman - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):604-628.
Felt evaluations: A theory of pleasure and pain.Bennett W. Helm - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.
Why people prefer pleasure to pain.Irwin Goldstein - 1980 - Philosophy 55 (July):349-362.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-06-19

Downloads
677 (#23,523)

6 months
89 (#46,437)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado, Boulder

Citations of this work

An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):887-907.
From the Heterogeneity Problem to a Natural‐Kind Approach to Pleasure.Antonin Broi - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (2):274-300.
Unknown pleasures.Ben Bramble - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1333-1344.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.
The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire.Chris Heathwood - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44.
Five Types of Ethical Theory.C. D. Broad - 1930 - Humana Mente 5 (19):463-465.
Two Questions about Pleasure.Fred Feldman - 1988 - In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 59-81.

View all 7 references / Add more references