The Truthmaker Account Is Not a Causal Theory

Acta Analytica 29 (3):383-388 (2014)


It is argued that the part-whole account of the relation between evidence and the larger state of affairs the evidence is evidence of—an account that was elucidated in the paper ‘Truthmaking, Evidence of, and Impossibility Proofs’ —provides a better basis for epistemology than causal relations between events. I apply this to a well-known phenomenon in physics which suggests that causal connectedness is not necessary for knowledge

Download options


    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,722

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

33 (#350,271)

6 months
3 (#198,250)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
Truthmaking and the Gettier Problem.Adrian Heathcote - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays. Elsevier Science. pp. 152--67.
Gettier and the Stopped Clock.A. Heathcote - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):309-314.
Truthmaking and the Alleged Need for Relevance.Adrian Heathcote - 2003 - Logique and Analyse 46 (183-184):345-364.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Truth-Makers and Dependence.David Liggins - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge University Press. pp. 254.
Causal Processes and Causal Interactions.Douglas Ehring - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:24 - 32.
Truthmaking Without Necessitation.Rachael Briggs - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):11-28.
Goldman’s Early Causal Theory of Knowledge.Stephen J. Sullivan & L. Gregory Wheeless - 1994 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 47 (1):143-154.
Truthmaking for Modal Skeptics.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):303-312.
Conditions of Knowledge.Herlinde Studer - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 14 (1):97-111.