Abstract

Stout's best known philosophical work is probably "The Nature of Universals and Propositions." In this paper Stout defends an ontology whose hallmarks are the claims that properties are particulars and that "universals" are unanalysable bundles of these particulars. Although anticipations of Stout's position can be found in the works of philosophers like Aristotle and Husserl, Stout is generally recognized as one of the first to explicitly embrace "abstract particularism." ;In essence, Stout's ontology consists of three categories of entities: abstract particulars and two distributive unity-making "ties." The first tie makes concrete particulars out of bundles of abstract particulars. The second tie makes "universals" out of bundles of abstract particulars. This ontology allows Stout to address the Problem of Individuation without postulating bare particulars. Stout's ontology is examined here in detail. ;Some criticisms of Stout's position are considered as well, particularly those made by two of Stout's most important contemporaries: Moore and Russell. Russell, for example, has argued that nominalist positions are subject to a regress known as the "resemblance regress." Stout's position, however, appears to escape this particular regress, since his distributive unities are not founded upon resemblance relations. ;Nevertheless, Stout's ontology does encounter other significant difficulties. Some of these problems are contingent upon Stout's underlying methodology. Thus, part of the task of assessing Stout's ontology consists of gauging the effects that various methodological choices have upon the overall success of Stout's ontology. Stout's position appears to be most plausible, for example, given a "minimalist" methodology . It's not clear, though, exactly what methodological principles Stout actually selected