Seeing and demonstration

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):199-206 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX


We see things. We also perceptually demonstrate things. There seems to be some sort of link between these two phenomena. Indeed. in the standard case, the former is accompanied by a capacity for the latter. One sees a dog and can, on the basis of one’s perceptual capacities, think thoughts of the form ‘That is F’. But how strong is that link? Does seeing a thing inevitably bring with it the capacity for perceptually demonstrating it? In what follows, we argue for a negative answer to this question. In so doing, we hope to shed some light on the phenomenon of perceptual demonstration. After presenting the main argument in section one, we go on in section two to consider a series of objections and replies



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Seeing and Demonstration.John Hawthorne & Mark Scala - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):199-206.
How Common Knowledge Is Possible.Daniel Immerman - 2022 - Mind 131 (523):935-948.
Seeing absence.Anna Farennikova - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):429-454.
The Epistemological Power of Taste.Louise Richardson - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3):398-416.
The Visual Role of Objects' Facing Surfaces.William E. S. Mcneill - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):411-431.
Seeing and Visual Reference.Kevin J. Lande - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):402-433.
Perception, attention, and the grand illusion.Alva Noë & Kevin J. O'Regan - 2000 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6.
On Seeing That Someone is Angry.William McNeill - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.


Added to PP

264 (#81,558)

6 months
27 (#135,954)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

John Hawthorne
University of Southern California
Mark Scala
West Texas A&M University

Citations of this work

A puzzle about seeing for representationalism.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2625-2646.
Demonstrative concepts without reidentification.Philippe Chuard - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references