II—John Hawthorne: Some Comments on Fricker's‘Stating and Insinuating’

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):95-108 (2012)
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Abstract

This discussion piece critically examines some of the key ideology that figures in Elizabeth Fricker's ‘Stating and Insinuating’, raises a number of queries about the details of Fricker's argumentation, and develops some ideas about the normative structure of testimony that relate to the themes of that paper.

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10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00209.x

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John Hawthorne
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.
Gricean Quality.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):689-703.
Sneaky Assertions.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):188-218.
Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.
Assertion, Implicature, and Iterated Knowledge.Eliran Haziza - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.

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References found in this work

Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.
What is Presupposition Accommodation, Again?Kai Von Fintel - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):137--170.
I—Elizabeth Fricker: Stating and Insinuating.Elizabeth Fricker - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):61-94.

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