Infelicitous Conditionals and KK

Mind 133 (529):196-209 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Kevin Dorst (2019) uses the ‘manifest unassertability’ of conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know p, then p’ as a new motivation for the KK thesis. In this paper we show that his argumentation is misguided. Plausible heuristics offer a compelling and nuanced explanation of the relevant infelicity data. Meanwhile, Dorst relies on tools that, quite independently of KK, turn out to be rather poor predictors of the infelicity of indicative conditionals.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,854

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-11-12

Downloads
118 (#183,910)

6 months
19 (#157,526)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

John Hawthorne
University of Southern California
Yoaav Isaacs
Baylor University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Taking a chance on KK.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):183-196.
Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
Subjunctives, dispositions and chances.Isaac Levi - 1977 - Synthese 34 (4):423 - 455.

View all 10 references / Add more references