Fission, fusion and intrinsic facts

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):602-621 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it’s hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the ‘only a and b’ rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience claim. Instead, I argue that closest continuer accounts are committed to unexplained correlations between distinct existences, and that this is their fundamental flaw. We can have independent justification for rejecting such correlations, but what the justification is depends upon much broader issues in ontology. There is no one-size-fits all objection to closest-continuer accounts of persistence

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,480

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Endurantist and Perdurantist Accounts of Persistence.Maureen Donnelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):27 - 51.
Humean Supervenience and Personal Identity.Ryan Wasserman - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):582-593.
Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases?Alan Sidelle - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):415-430.
Supervenience and (Non-Modal) Reductionism in Leibniz's Philosophy of Time.J. M. - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (4):793-810.
The Closest Continuer View Revisited.Marc Slors - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):387-402.
Supervenience and Microphysics.Terence E. Horgan - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):29-43.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
238 (#50,246)

6 months
2 (#277,663)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Katherine Hawley
PhD: Cambridge University; Last affiliation: University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

The Fundamental and the Brute.Ralf Bader - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1121-1142.
Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
Non-Branching Personal Persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.
Fission May Kill You.Heather Demarest - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):565-582.
Part‐Intrinsicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):431-452.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.

View all 66 references / Add more references