Institutional Opacity, Epistemic Vulnerability, and Institutional Testimonial Justice

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):473-496 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper offers an account of institutional testimonial justice and describes one way that it breaks down, which we call institutional opacity. An institution is opaque when it becomes resistant to epistemic evaluation and understanding by its agents and users. When one cannot understand the inner workings of an institution, it becomes difficult to know how to comport oneself testimonially. We offer an account of an institutional ethos to explain what it means for an institution to be testimonially just; we then describe how an ethos of institutional testimonial justice can break down when the institution becomes opaque. An opaque institution is especially problematic for individuals and groups already rendered epistemically vulnerable during their interactions with that institution, which we call epistemically vulnerabilised individuals. We articulate the features of an encounter between an epistemically vulnerabilised individual and an opaque institution. We end by tracing ameliorative strategies that could help repair a deteriorated institutional ethos of testimonial justice.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.
The Vulnerable Dynamics of Discourse.Paul Giladi & Danielle Petherbridge - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:195-225.
Intellectual Humility, Testimony, and Epistemic Injustice.Ian M. Church - 2021 - In Mark Alfano, Michael Patrick Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. New York, NY: Routledge.
Healthcare Practice, Epistemic Injustice, and Naturalism.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-23.
Epistemic Vulnerability.Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (5):677-691.
Exploitative Epistemic Trust.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - In Trust in Epistemology. New York City, New York, Vereinigte Staaten: pp. 241-264.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-09-07

Downloads
92 (#182,422)

6 months
30 (#103,601)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Havi Carel
University of Bristol
Ian James Kidd
Nottingham University

References found in this work

Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny.Kate Manne - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.Kristie Dotson - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):115-138.
Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.

View all 32 references / Add more references