The understanding of own and others’ actions during infancy

Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies / Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies 6 (3):429-445 (2005)
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Abstract

Developmental psychologists assume that infants understand other persons’ actions after and because they understand their own. However, there is another possibility as well, namely that infants come to understand their own actions after and because they understand other persons’ actions. We reviewed infant research on the influence of perceived actions on self-performed actions as well as the reverse. Furthermore, we investigated the interplay between both aspects of action understanding by means of a sequence variation. The results show the impact of agentive experience for action understanding, but not the reverse. The question whether infants’ perceived and to-be-produced actions share common representations of the perceptual and the motor system is discussed in relation to its implications for the social making of minds.

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The Problem of Mental Action.Thomas Metzinger - 2017 - Philosophy and Predicitive Processing.

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