Minds and Machines 3 (1):21-29 (1993)
Abstract |
It will be found that the great majority, given the premiss that thought is not distinct from corporeal motion, take a much more rational line and maintain that thought is the same in the brutes as in us, since they observe all sorts of corporeal motions in them, just as in us. And they will add that the difference, which is merely one of degree, does not imply any essential difference; from this they will be quite justified in concluding that, although there may be a smaller degree of reason in the beasts than there is in us, the beasts possess minds which are of exactly the same type as ours. (Descartes 1642: 288–289.)
|
Keywords | Artificial Intelligence Causation Mind Puzzle Science Unity Rapaport, W |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/BF00974303 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
View all 29 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction.B. Jack Copeland - 1993 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
Why Isn't My Pocket Calculator a Thinking Thing?Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):3-10.
Sixteen Years of Artificial Intelligence: Mind Design and Mind Design II.Andrew beedle - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):243 – 250.
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: A Course Outline.William J. Rapaport - 1986 - Teaching Philosophy 9 (2):103-120.
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: A Critique of the Mechanistic Theory of Mind.Rajakishore Nath - 2009 - Universal Publishers.
Artificial Intelligence and Wittgenstein.Gerard Casey - 1988 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 32:156-175.
Because Mere Calculating Isn't Thinking: Comments on Hauser's Why Isn't My Pocket Calculator a Thinking Thing?.William J. Rapaport - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):11-20.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
54 ( #208,349 of 2,499,033 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #419,059 of 2,499,033 )
2009-01-28
Total views
54 ( #208,349 of 2,499,033 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #419,059 of 2,499,033 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads