No microphysical causation? No problem: selective causal skepticism and the structure of completeness-based arguments for physicalism

Synthese 196 (3):1187-1208 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A number of philosophers have argued that causation is not an objective feature of the microphysical world but rather is a perspectival phenomenon that holds only between “coarse-grained” entities such as those that figure in the special sciences. This view seems to pose a problem for arguments for physicalism that rely on the alleged causal completeness of physics. In this paper, I address this problem by arguing that the completeness of physics has two components, only one of which is causal. These two components of completeness can be used in an argument for physicalism that is supported by strong inductive evidence even in the absence of microphysical causation.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,102

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Microphysical Causation and the Case for Physicalism.Alyssa Ney - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):141-164.
Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics.David Yates - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110-131.
Causal compatibilism -- what chance?Jack Ritchie - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (1):119-132.
The Pitfalls of Microphysical Realism.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1156-1164.
A definition of physicalism.Philip Pettit - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):213-23.
Some Evidence for Physicalism.Andrew Melnyk - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 155-172.
Physicalism and the problem of mental causation.Robert Buckley - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
Mental causation in a physical world.Eric Marcus - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50.
Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation.Robert Buckley - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26:155-174.
On the causal completeness of physics.Agustín Vicente - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.
Physicalism and overdetermination.Scott Sturgeon - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):411-432.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-11

Downloads
117 (#145,318)

6 months
8 (#209,681)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Matthew Haug
William & Mary

Citations of this work

Causation in Physics and in Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):471-488.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

View all 58 references / Add more references