Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):23 – 43 (2008)
AbstractC. B. Martin's finkish cases raise one of the most serious objections to conditional analyses of dispositions. David Lewis's reformed analysis is widely considered the most promising response to the objection. Despite its sophistication, however, the reformed analysis still provokes questions concerning its ability to handle finkish cases. They focus on the applicability of the analysis to 'baseless' dispositions. After sketching Martin's objection and the reformed analysis, I argue that all dispositions have causal bases which the analysis can unproblematically invoke.
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Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions, and Finkish Dispositions.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209.