Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (4):436-474 (2018)

Abstract
What is the correct epistemic stance that laypeople should take vis-a-vis epistemic authorities? The author provides an answer to this question based on a critical examination of Linda Zagzebski’s Preemption Thesis, according to which the fact that an authority has a belief p is a reason for a layperson to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. In contrast, the author argues that epistemic deference requires a layperson to perform a number of epistemic tasks and involves an active and critical stance that conflicts with the Preemption Thesis.
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DOI 10.1163/18756735-000045
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References found in this work BETA

Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
Inductive Risk and Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.

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The Weaknesses of Weak Preemptionism.Rico Hauswald - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):37-55.

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