Instrumental rules and motivation

Legal Theory 12 (4):315-345 (2006)
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Abstract

In this paper I address the issue of the normativity of instrumental rules (for example, legal rules). On the one hand, I criticize Scott Shapiro's of instrumental rule-following according to which instrumental rules have motivational clout qua rules: the agent conforms to them simplybecause they are rules. On the other, I argue for a purely epistemic account of instrumental rule-following. According to this account, instrumental rules inform the agent which action she is required to perform but do not get her to act. Rather the agent is motivationally guided by the reasons for which she adopted the instrumental rules

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Antony Hatzistavrou
University of Hull

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