Synthese 184 (1):73-87 (2012)

Authors
Stephan Hartmann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
In a famous experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (Psychol Rev 90:293–315, 1983), featuring Linda the bank teller, the participants assign a higher probability to a conjunction of propositions than to one of the conjuncts, thereby seemingly committing a probabilistic fallacy. In this paper, we discuss a slightly different example featuring someone named Walter, who also happens to work at a bank, and argue that, in this example, it is rational to assign a higher probability to the conjunction of suitably chosen propositions than to one of the conjuncts. By pointing out the similarities between Tversky and Kahneman’s experiment and our example, we argue that the participants in the experiment may assign probabilities to the propositions in question in such a way that it is also rational for them to give the conjunction a higher probability than one of the conjuncts
Keywords Conjunction fallacy  Linda problem  Psychology of reasoning  Bayesian epistemology
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Reprint years 2010, 2012
DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9694-6
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References found in this work BETA

Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Is Coherence Truth Conducive?T. Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338-345.
Is Coherence Truth Conducive?Tomoji Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338–345.

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Citations of this work BETA

Being Realist About Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):185-220.
Bayesian Epistemology.Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2010 - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. London: Routledge. pp. 609-620.

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