Abstract

Most value theories suppose that there are some values, such as autonomy or happiness, that one is always justified in valuing. These values are foundational, and all other values can be justified in terms of these foundations. For example, utilitarian theories suppose that happiness is intrinsically valuable and that art is valuable because experiencing art makes people happy. Foundational approaches sort all values into these two broad categories, intrinsic and extrinsic, and so, I argue, they overlook the interdependence of values on one another. In this dissertation I defend a coherence theory of value justification, according to which the reasons for valuing phenomena such as beauty, happiness, and autonomy are interdependent and mutually supporting. The coherence view suggests that we can understand the value of some object by asking whether and how valuing that object coheres with our other values, and especially with our core values. I go on to argue that this view offers some new and potentially rewarding ways of understanding some very difficult topics: e.g., the value of preserving wilderness, promoting art, and the value of human life without consciousness. In addition, I show that a coherence view can explain the relationships between aesthetic values and strictly moral values