The Place of Psychoanalysis in the History of Ethics

Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):598-618 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Psychoanalytic writing rarely features on university ethics curricula, so the idea that psychoanalysis has a place in the history of ethics may be a surprise. The aim of the paper is to show that it should not be. The strategy is to sketch in outline an enduring line of inquiry in the history of ethics, namely the Platonic-Aristotelian investigation of the relationship between human nature, human excellence and the human good, and to suggest that psychoanalysis exemplifies it too. But since the suggestion, once made, seems not only true but obviously true, the paper spends some time exploring why the place of psychoanalysis in the history of ethics has so often been overlooked, before developing the outline more fully and offering detailed reasons as to why psychoanalysis fits it. One consequence is that Freudian and ‘relational’ variants of psychoanalysis continue the Platonic-Aristotelian line of inquiry in interestingly different ways

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Explanation in psychoanalysis and history.Edward H. Madden - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (3):278-286.
Psychoanalysis, fascism, and fundamentalism.Julia Borossa & Ivan Ward (eds.) - 2009 - Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Departures: The American Future of Psychoanalysis.Martin McQuillan - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (S1):142-157.
The truthfulness of psychoanalysis.Fredrik Svenaeus - 2000 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (4):355-360.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-23

Downloads
24 (#620,575)

6 months
6 (#431,022)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Edward Harcourt
Oxford University

Citations of this work

Invideo et Amo: on Envying the Beloved.Sara Protasi - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1765-1784.
From personality disorders to the fact-value distinction.Konrad Banicki - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):274-298.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references