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The Problem of Induction
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):559-575 (2006)
Abstract
The problem of induction is sometimes motivated via a comparison between rules of induction and rules of deduction. Valid deductive rules are necessarily truth preserving, while inductive rules are not.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Inferentialism: Why Rules Matter.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2014 - London and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference not Consequence.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (4):639-665.
Conditionals and consequences.Gregory Wheeler, Henry E. Kyburg & Choh Man Teng - 2007 - Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):638-650.
Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Selected Papers of J. Anthony Blair.John Anthony Blair - 2011 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
References found in this work
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
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