Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2535-2555 (2020)

Abstract
The idea that emotional experience is capable of lending immediate and defeasible justification to evaluative belief has been amassing significant support in recent years. The proposal that it is my anger, say, that justifies my belief that I’ve been wronged putatively provides us with an intuitive and naturalised explanation as to how we receive epistemic justification for a rich catalogue of our evaluative beliefs. However, despite the fact that this justificatory thesis of emotion is fundamentally an epistemological proposal, comparatively little has been done to explicitly isolate what it is about emotions that bestows them with justificatory ability. The purpose of this paper is to provide a novel and thorough analysis into the prospects of phenomenology-based—or dogmatist—views of emotional justification. By surveying and rejecting various instantiations of the emotional dogmatist view, I endeavour to provide an inductive case for the conclusion that emotional phenomenology cannot be the seat of the emotions’ power to immediately justify evaluative belief.
Keywords Emotion  Phenomenal Dogmatism  Epistemic Justification
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Reprint years 2021
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-020-01561-5
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References found in this work BETA

Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.
Intuition.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Oxford University Press.

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