The Is-Ought Problem Stems From Morality as a Simplifying Framework

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that David Hume's is-ought problem stems from morality as a simplifying framework. Morality is the attempt to describe human behaviour and its relation to nature through a court framework, dating to prehistoric times. Such a court does not really exist, hence we are not referring to anything directly when we make moral statements, and therefore 'is' and 'ought' do not align. The solution is to replace morality with what it's really trying to describe: patterns in individual behaviour.

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