The complexity of Wittgenstein's methods

Philosophy 83 (2):255-265 (2008)
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Abstract

In claiming to draw out an inconsistency between Wittgenstein's declarations on method and his actual practice, John Cook argues that Wittgenstein retained a radical distinction between material things (bricks) and immaterial things (spooks). I argue that on the contrary Wittgenstein showed in detail how this dichotomy is to be rejected in favour of a spectrum of more or less 'minded' beings, at one pole of which are persons as animated bodies. Discussing the grammar of 'know', Cook claims that Wittgenstein depended on philosophers' distinctions rather than a surview of vernacular uses. I argue that it was the expression/description distinction that Wittgenstein used to make sense of the grammar of 'know'

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2009-01-28

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Rom Harré
Last affiliation: Oxford University

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