Two challenges for a boolean approach to constitutive inference

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):17 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper discusses two challenges for a Boolean method for establishing constitutive regularity statements which, according to the regularity theory of mechanistic constitution, form the core of any mechanistic explanation in neuroscience. After presenting the regularity definition for the constitution relation and a methodology for constitutive inference, the paper discusses the problem of full variation of tested mechanistic factors and the problem of informational redundancy. A solution is offered for each problem. The first requires some adjustments to the original theory by introducing the technical notion of a set of types satisfying independent instantiability. The second one is resolved by demonstrating that the problem of informational redundancy is based on a confusion that fails to challenge the theory. It is concluded that the methodology of constitutive inference is consistent and plausible with respect to actual practice in neuroscience.

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References found in this work

Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Explaining the Brain.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Explanation: a mechanist alternative.William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):421-441.
Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.

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