Operationalism: Idealism or realism?

Philosophy of Science 9 (4):350-355 (1942)
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Abstract

As presented by some, operationalism in sociology is Kantian in its view of the universe, of the assumptions and limitations of science, and of the scientist's ability to analyse and present the reality of the universe.In his exposition, George A. Lundberg rests operationalism upon a twofold basis. First there is a materially-conceived nature. This is expressed in the terms “X,” “the cosmos,” or “that which arouses certain responses.” We do not know, cannot know, nor can science tell us, anything about the nature of this X, save that it precipitates responses. This position is qualified by making existence always relative to some responding organism. There is nothing final in the terms “existence” or “reality,” such as is usually implied in the terms “truth” and “fact.” An objective reality existing entirely independently of anyone's observations is believed by Lundberg to be incompatible with his philosophical basis. The only justification for this position is “… its demonstrable efficiency in helping us comprehend our world.”

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